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BANKRUPTCY SOLUTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW
Karen Gross* & Matthew S. Bair*
1. INTRODUCTION
A country's treatment of its distressed businesses speaks volumes
about the oft-times unarticulated views of that country's perceptions of risk
taking, market structure, human nature, social mores and religious beliefs.
Hopefully, this symposium, through the use of a master hypothetical (the
"Hypothetical") and dialogue among the participants, will provide a
mechanism for allowing the represented countries' views to emerge. This
article presents the United States' response to the questions raised by the
Hypothetical. By necessity, the answers are limited as one could easily
write a book or teach a semester long course from the Hypothetical.'
I. ANSWER TO QUESTION 1
OF THE HYPOTHETICAL
Heavy Duty, our hypothetical debtor, has options under both state and
federal law. While this article focuses on the comprehensive federal
statute, title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code" or the
"Code"), 2 three non-federal alternatives are noteworthy: an assignment for
the benefit of creditors ("ABC"), an out-of-court workout through a
composition or other extension agreement ("Workout") and a receivership.
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
** Associate, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York; J.D., New York
Law School.
1. The answers, except as to Question 5, deal solely with business debtors, and the
answer to Question 1 contains background material and hence is considerably longer than
the other responses. Professor Gross has contemplated using the format of the program
as the format for a course, with each student being assigned to represent a different
country. The course would then encompass resolving the Hypothetical.
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330 (1996).
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An ABC is a form of liquidation under state law. The debtor executes
a voluntary assignment of ownership of its non-exempt assets to an
assignee who holds the property in trust for the benefit of its creditors.3
The assignee liquidates the assets and makes a pro rata distribution among
those creditors who file claims with the assignee.4 Continuing to run a
business or rehabilitate a distressed debtor is beyond the scope of an ABC.5
Although there are analogies between an ABC and a liquidation under
Chapter 7 of the Code, an ABC does not provide many of the protections
Chapter 7 debtors enjoy. For example, creditors are not stayed from
pursuing unassigned assets; 6 the assignee does not have the same powers
as a bankruptcy trustee,7 most particularly the avoiding powers; and the
assignment is only binding on consenting creditors. 8  While non-
participating creditors are prohibited from levying upon assigned property
(as ownership has transferred), their debts are not discharged by the
assignment.9 Further, because there are fewer administrative expenses, an
ABC may be less costly than a Chapter 7 case.
A Workout may be a very successful tool in times of temporary
difficulty. It enables a company to continue operating its business and is
less expensive than its federal counterpart, a Chapter 11 case. A
financially troubled debtor and all or some of its creditors can voluntarily
negotiate a Workout agreement.' 0 The Workout is a contract that provides
for the reduction of indebtedness or an extension of the payment term, or
3. RICHARD I. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.02 (1996).
4. Id.; see generally ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS FOR TttE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS (5th ed. 1887).
5. See AARON, supra note 3, citing In re Maine State Raceways, 97 F. Supp. 1016 (D.
Me. 1951); F.H. Roberts Co. v. Hopkins, Inc., 296 Mass. 519 (1937).
6. See generally DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY §§ 3-1 to 3-35 (1993).
7. The Code provides a Chapter 7 trustee with "avoiding powers." For example, the
trustee has the power to avoid a preference under § 547 of the Code.
8. See International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 49 S. Ct. 108 (1929), in which the Supreme
Court held that state statutes cannot grant discharges as the statute would be invalid under
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution because the power to discharge
debts is part of Congress' bankruptcy power. Thus, a creditor must consent to the
assignment in order for that creditor's rights to be affected.
9. Id.
10. See Conrad B. Dubersteiri, Out-of-Court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
347 (1993); Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool
Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 337, 351 (1993).
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both." Voluntary acceptance by substantially all creditors of a like kind
is essential for the success of a Workout. Non-consenting creditors are not
bound by the Workout; these creditors can be expected to proceed with
collection efforts, thereby preventing the preservation of the debtor's estate
and discouraging the cooperating creditors from forbearing on their own
collection proceedings. 2 Without widespread creditor acceptance of the
Workout, it is almost impossible for the debtor and consenting creditors to
achieve their desired end.'3
A Workout is also impractical if the debtor has a large number of
creditors or if creditors do not trust the debtor.'4 In some Workout
situations, the creditors create a committee, whose members are fiduciaries
to similarly situated creditors. 5  The committee's duties include
monitoring, investigating, negotiating with the debtor and recommending
to its constituency a moratorium on debt collection efforts.' 6  This
moratorium provides the debtor with breathing space free of creditor
harassment while it attempts to improve its financial prospects.' 7 Unlike
a Chapter 11, a Workout does not provide for recovery of preferences or
assumption or rejection of executory contracts or leases.18 In recent years,
some debtors have completed a Workout which is then intentionally
followed by a Chapter 11 case. In essence, this approach, termed a "pre-
pack," enables the debtor to get the benefits of a Workout and the Code
without excessive cost and delay.' 9
A receiver is an impartial, ministerial officer appointed by a state
court, with powers prescribed by said court.20 A receiver is commonly
11. See EPSTEIN, supra note 6, §§ 6-11 & 9-17.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See AARON, supra note 3, § 1.02[4].
15. Id.
16. See RICHARD F. BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE § 1.01 (1996).
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 & 365, respectively.
19. See 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 86:20 (2d ed. 1993); Duberstein, supra note 10, at 365; Ralph E. Avery, Article 111 and
Title 11: A Constitutional Collision, 12 BANK. DEV. J. 397, 442 (1993); David M.
Friedman et al., Pre-Packaged Plans of Reorganization 733 P.L.I./CORP. 441 (1991);
Thomas E. Biron & Jeffrey W. Broker, Non-Bankruptcy Workouts 357 P.L.I./COM. 123
(1985).
20. See CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF RECEIVERS § 1
(1887).
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appointed when there is a demonstrated need for protection, preservation,
or orderly liquidation of real property. A receivership allows the property
actively to be administered or conserved to prevent deterioration or
maintain its value.2 However, a receiver does not possess the wide range
of powers held by a trustee or debtor-in-possession in Chapter 11 cases.
None of the state law options seem beneficial to Heavy Duty, save
perhaps a Workout. However, a Workout would require all or many of
Heavy Duty's creditors to cooperate and, given their number and diversity,
a Workout seems unlikely. Thus, bankruptcy seems to be Heavy Duty's
best alternative to obtain relief from its financial strain.
Despite the appeal of nonbankruptcy alternatives, many financially
distressed businesses in the United States chose the federal bankruptcy
system to garner relief from economic woes.22 The Code basically
provides distressed businesses with two options: liquidation or
reorganization. Chapter 7 is the liquidation chapter, although a liquidating
plan can be filed under Chapter 11. Reorganization for businesses is
usually achieved through Chapter 11. Chapters 9, 12 and 13 also provide
for reorganization of particular categories of debtors. Chapter 9 is
available for municipalities; 23 Chapter 12 is utilized by family farmers with
debts below one million dollars;24 and Chapter 13 is only available to
individuals with regular income and debt within prescribed limits.
25
21. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (6th ed. 1991).
22. Filings for calendar year 1996 were 1,178,555. See "96 Filings up 27 Percent," 11
BANKR. CT. DEC. AlI (April 1, 1997); see also GEORGE PUTNAM, III, 1997 BANKRUPTCY
YEARBOOK & ALMANAC 31-40 (7th ed. 1997).
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) for eligibility requirements of a Chapter 9 debtor. See also
§ 10t(40) which defines "municipatity" as a "pGotiticat subdivisia or Public agency or
instrumentality of a State." Chapter 9 is housed at 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 and is titled
"Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality."
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) for eligibility requirements of a Chapter 12 debtor. Chapter
12 is housed at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-31 and is titled "Adjustment of Debts of a Family
Farmer with Regular Annual Income." Chapter 12 is only available to family farmers with
regular income who actually conduct farming operations. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(f) &
101(18)(B). Chapter 12 is designed to give family farmers an opportunity to reorganize
their debts and keep their land. It is largely based on Chapter 13, but includes some
elements of Chapter 11 and some special provisions for smaller, family-owned operations.
See generally DANIEL R. COWANS, COWANS BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 21.1
(1994).
25. See I 1 U.S.C. § 109(e) for eligibility requirements of a Chapter 13 debtor. See also
11 U.S.C. § 10 1(30), which defines "individual with regular income" as an "individual
whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments
under a plan under chapter 13. . . other than a stockbroker or a commodity broker." The
Chapter 13 debtor must also have unsecured debts below $250,000 and secured debts
[Vol. 17
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One of the remarkable features of United States law is that a business
does not need to be insolvent to access the federal bankruptcy system.z6
Although courts have created a good faith requirement, the existence of net
worth is not an example of bad faith. 7 In the United States, the vast
majority of bankruptcy cases are voluntary,28 and most business cases
involve liquidations rather than reorganizations.29
A. Liquidation: Relief for Businesses under Chapter 7
and the Chapter 11 Liquidating Plan.
A liquidation generally is the final disposition of a business. The aim
of Chapter 7 is the surrender and dissolution of the debtor's estate for the
purpose of generating a fund to repay creditors.3" A Chapter 7 trustee is
appointed by the United States Trustee (from a panel of trustees) and is
responsible for collecting the debtor's unencumbered assets, converting
them into cash and making a distribution to creditors who have allowed
claims against the estate.3 Creditors are usually passive and rely on the
below $750,000. Chapter 13 is housed at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 and is titled "Adjustment
of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income." Chapter 13 is designed to enable an
individual to keep all or most of his or her assets and to use future income to pay creditors
at least as much as they would receive under a Chapter 7 liquidation. A Chapter 13 case
must be commenced voluntarily because "short of involuntary servitude, it is difficult to
keep a debtor from working for his or her creditors when he does not want to pay them
back." See S. REP. No. 95-989 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787. In all
Chapter 13 cases, a trustee is appointed to collect and disburse payments under the plan,
account for the property of the estate, investigate the debtor's affairs, examine and object
to proofs of claims, help the debtor formulate a plan, and participate in the confirmation
and discharge hearings.
26. However, it should be noted that under § 303(h)(1), involuntary filings, the
petitioning creditor(s) must demonstrate that the debtor is generally not paying its debts as
they become due. This test is not a balance sheet insolvency test nor an equity insolvency
test, although it is close. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1).
27. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Legal Theory: The Implied
Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L.
REV. 919 (1991).
28. See Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why
the Number is not too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803 (1991).
29. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM (1997), for a breakdown and analysis of data on bankruptcy filings released by
the Administrative Office.
30. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, § 7-1.
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 for list of trustee's duties.
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trustee to administer the estate in their best interest.32 Funds are distributed
to unsecured creditors in accordance with the Code's order of priority.
33
Commonly, there are insufficient funds to repay all creditors in full; this
means that creditors receive only a pro rata payment of their claim.34
Sometimes creditors receive no distribution at all. Unlike an individual
debtor, a business is not granted a discharge under Chapter 7.36 This is to
prevent debtors from trafficking in corporate shells for tax purposes.
Although a business is technically still liable for the unsatisfied balance of
a claim with no discharge in place, the claim is virtually uncollectible.
A business can also liquidate through a Chapter 11 liquidating plan.37
Chapter 11 liquidating plans have been used when more funds can be
generated for creditors through a slow wind-down of the business through
the efforts of management rather than a fire sale of the assets conducted
by a Chapter 7 trustee. 38 Although available and employed by default,
Chapter 11 liquidating plans are not commonly employed as most
companies in Chapter 1 1 aim for their businesses to reorganize, not
liquidate.39
A voluntary liquidation is not an appropriate remedy for Heavy Duty,
our hypothetical debtor. Heavy Duty has a viable business that is
experiencing temporary financial trouble due to a shortage of raw
materials. The owners/shareholders do not want to shut Heavy Duty's
door. Rather, with some debt adjustment, there appears to be a future for
Heavy Duty. Thus, liquidation is not the avenue for Heavy Duty to pursue
at this time.
B. Rehabilitation: Relief for Businesses under Chapter 11
Chapter 11 enables a business with considerable debt to reorganize.
This prevents the loss of jobs and preserves assets. Although there is
32. AARON, supra note 3, § 12.02.
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 507.
34. See generally Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other
Direct Costs in Small Finn Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 847 (1994).
35. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, § 7-3 & 7-9.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 727.
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) which states that a plan of reorganization may
provide for the "sale of all or any part of the property of the estate" and for the distribution
of the proceeds to creditors or interest holders. See also BENJAMIN 'WEINTRAUB & ALAN
N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL I 8.19[3][c] (1996).
38. BROUDE, supra note 16, § 7.03[2].
39. Id.
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considerable academic controversy regarding the goals and success of
Chapter 11,4 there is general consensus that it provides a mechanism for
preserving a business and enabling creditors to receive at least as much as
they would receive in a Chapter 7 case. There is also, depending on one's
perspective, a sense that Chapter 11 serves the interests of community.4'
When the Code was enacted in 1978, Chapter 11 was a one size fits
all chapter. However, because of the vast differences among debtors and
the belief that some debtors should proceed more rapidly through the
system, two major changes were made. In October 1994, Congress
amended the Code to provide small businesses and single asset real estate
debtors different treatment under Chapter 11.41
The small business amendments afford a debtor having noncontingent,
liquidated, secured and unsecured debt aggregating no more than $2million,
the opportunity to elect to be treated as a small business. 43 This election
provides the debtor with some benefits over a standard Chapter 11 debtor.
44
First, upon a showing of cause, the debtor may avoid the formation of a
creditors' committee; and secondly, the court may combine the plan and
disclosure hearings to expedite the reorganization process. 41 In exchange
40. See Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of
Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85 (1995); Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,
Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 817 (1987); see
generally GROSS, supra note 29. The success of Chapter 11 cases has been the subject of
considerable debate and a sizable number of reorganizations ultimately do not succeed (in
a traditional sense) and lead to liquidation. See Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed
Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The Results of a Study and A nalysis of the Law, 97 COM.
L.J. 297 (1992); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 729
(1993).
41. See generally GROSS, supra note 29; Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into
Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994).
42. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 (codified as amended
at scattered sections of 11 U.S.C,), 108 Stat. 4106, 4127-28 (1994), providing new §
1121(e) (the "1994 Amendments"). The National Bankruptcy Review Commission, also
created as part of the 1994 Amendments, is going to recommend further changes in this
area when it issues its final report in October, 1997.
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51C) for the definition of "small business."
44. See Karen Gross & Patricia Redmond, In Defense of Debtor Exclusivity: A ssessing
Four of the 1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 298-301.
Case law suggests, however, that the 1994 Amendments have not been without problems.
For example, the provisions regarding creditors' committees has created, not eliminated,
litigation. Id.
45. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 1 102(a)(3) & 1125(f). See also Gross & Redmond, supra note
44, at 298.
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for these benefits, the period in which the debtor has the exclusive right to
file a plan is shortened to 100 (rather than 120) days after the
commencement of the case, and all plans must be filed within 160 days of
the commencement of the case (rather than at any time during the case).4 6
The single asset real estate debtor is also treated differently. The Code
defines a "single asset real estate"debtor as one with a single project, other
than one with four or less residential units, with aggregate debts of no
more than $4 million.47 Section 362(d) of the Code provides relief from
the automatic stay in single asset real estate cases unless the debtor files
a viable plan of reorganization or commences making payments to the
secured real estate lender within ninety days of the date of filing of the
petition.48 These provisions create a "make it or break it" scenario for
single asset real estate cases within ninety days after the order for relief is
entered. 9
The filing of a Chapter 11 petition gives the debtor immediate relief
in the form of an automatic stay.50 The automatic stay, one of the most
important benefits accorded debtors, l5 insulates debtors from the pressures
of debt collection. This enables management to concentrate on developing
a plan free from creditor collection efforts including pending litigation. 2
One of the key features of Chapter 11, which distinguishes the United
States' system from that which exists in other countries, is that the debtor
46. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e).
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) which specifically defines "single asset real estate" as
"real property constituting a single property or project, other than residential real property
with fewer than four residential units, which generates substantially all of the gross income
of a debtor and on which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other than
the business of operating the real property and activities incidental thereto having aggregate
noncontingent, liquidated secured debts in an amount no more than $4,000,000." This
definition has already generated controversy, and there is legislation pending to eliminate
the debt ceiling.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3).
49. See Gross & Redmond, supra note 44, at 303.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). It should be noted that if the debtor is a small business, it is
likely that the principal owner(s) gave personal guarantees of business obligations. Section
362's automatic stay does not protect the guarantors from collection actions. COWANS,
supra note 24, §20.1. However, on rare occasions, courts stay such actions against the
guarantor if rehabilitation of the debtor is threatened. See, e.g., In re Lamar Estates, Inc.,
5 B.R. 328 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). See infra part VI.
51. Stanley M. Spracker & James D. Barnette, The Treatment of Environmental Matters
in Bankruptcy Cases, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 85, 86-87 (1994).
52. Id.
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is permitted to remain in control of its business and operate as a "debtor-
in-possession" ("DIP"). The DIP can be removed and a trustee appointed
only in limited circumstances.53 The DIP has all the rights of a trustee
under the Code5 4 and has the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization
within 120 days of the filing.55 If the debtor does not file a plan within the
exclusive period, which is commonly extended by the court beyond the
initial 120 day period,56 any party in interest57 has the right to file a plan.58
The United States Trustee is required to appoint a committee of
unsecured creditors in each Chapter 11 case,59 and other committees, such
as a bondholders' committee and an equity-holders' committee, may also
be appointed. 60 These committees represent and safeguard the interests of
their constituents. 6' A committee may employ legal counsel or other
professionals, confer with the DIP in the administration of the estate,
conduct investigations into the debtor's financial affairs and participate in
plan formation.62
A Chapter 11 plan may modify the rights of secured and unsecured
creditors or equity security holders.63 Additionally, a plan may be
confirmed over the objections of one or more classes of creditors or equity
holders.' However, this is not to say that the Code does not protect
creditors and there are no restrictions on a debtor. For example, the court
cannot confirm a plan of reorganization if the holder of an impaired claim
or interest has not accepted the plan and the plan does not provide that
53. 11 U.S.C. § 1108.
54. Id.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a). As noted, Congress has specified two particular types of
debtors that must file a plan of reorganization sooner than 120 days: small businesses and
single asset real estate debtors. See Gross and Redmond, supra note 44, at 298-304.
56. See Lynn M. LoPucki and William Whitford, Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations of Large, Publicly Held Corporations, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993).
57. See 11 U.S.C. §1109 which defines a "party in interest" as including "a debtor, the
trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity
security holder, or any indenture trustee .. " The court is also recognized as a "party in
interest." See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c).
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l).
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102.
61. See EPSTEIN, supra note 6, §§ 1-4, 10-11 & 10-12.
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103.
63. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129 & 1141.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
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holder with at least what it would have received if the debtor liquidated
under Chapter 7 of the Code (known as the "best interest of creditors'
test").65 The court cannot confirm a plan that pays a junior creditor unless
a more senior class of creditors is paid in full or the more senior class
consents to such payment (known as the "absolute priority rule").66
Further, a court cannot confirm a plan of reorganization unless the court
determines that the plan is feasible, in the sense that confirmation is not
likely to be followed by liquidation or the need foT further financial
reorganization.67 If a plan meets the statutory requirements, the court
confirms the plan, and it becomes binding upon creditors even if they
voted against it.
68
Heavy Duty is a good candidate for relief under Chapter 1 1.69 The
Code does not require that a debtor be equitable or balance-sheet insolvent
as a precondition to filing for voluntary relief.70 Generally, businesses
having a place of business in the United States are eligible for Chapter 11
relief.7 ' Heavy Duty would likely file a voluntary case, although creditors
could seek to file an involuntary case.72
65. See generally COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, I 1102.01 (1996); see also 11 U.S.C. §
1129(a)(7).
66. See generally COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 65, J 1102.01; see also 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
67. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 65, 1102.01; see 11 U.S.C. §
1129(a)(1 1).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(ii).
69. Heavy Duty is eligible for Chapter 11 relief. Section 109(d) provides that a Chapter
11 debtor must be eligible to be a Chapter 7 debtor under § 109(b), except that a railroad
may be a Chapter 11 debtor and a stockbroker or commodity broker may not. See also
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991) (' The plain language of the Bankruptcy Code
permits individuals not engaged in business to file for relief under Chapter 11"). Heavy
Duty is not eligible for relief under Chapter 12. Heavy Duty does not satisfy the
requirements to be classified as a family farmer. Even if farming operations was broadly
defined to include the manufacturing of farming equipment (i.e. bulldozers), Heavy Duty
has over $9,500,000 in debt arising from its operations, more than the debt limitation of
§ 101(18)(B). Therefore, Heavy Duty is not eligible for relief under Chapter 12.
70. Block-Lieb, supra note 28, at 409 (citing COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 65,
§ 301.13); Selinda A. Melnik, Commencing a Voluntary Case under Chapter 7or 11, 585
P.L.I./ COM. 45 (citing In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc., 709 F.2d 762 (1st Cir 1983)); In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a).
72. See It U.S.C. §§ 301. & 303 for requirements to file voluntary and involuntary
petitions. Creditors can file an involuntary Chapter 11 against a business debtor that may
be a voluntary Chapter 11 debtor that is not a farmer, family farmer, or a not-for-profit
business. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a). Section 303 of the Code sets forth the number of
[Vol. 17224
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A voluntary Chapter 11 is commenced by the filing of a petition with
the bankruptcy court by an entity that may be a debtor under Chapter 11
and the payment of a filing fee.73 Heavy Duty's corporate officers would
not be empowered to file voluntary bankruptcy petitions on behalf of the
corporation because state law delegates corporate management to the board
of directors.74 Most likely, the act of filing a Chapter II petition would
require approval by Heavy Duty's board of directors. Without such
approval, the petition will be dismissed.75
Chapter 11 is Heavy Duty's best choice for relief7 6 because it is
experiencing temporary financial difficulty, mainly due to a shortage of
raw materials. Due to the Heavy Duty's performance over the past forty-
creditors, as well as the quantity and quality of their claims, needed for a properly filed
involuntary petition. For example, if the debtor has 13 creditors, at least 3 or more
creditors holding claims that are neither contingent nor the subject of bona fide disputes,
and that total at least $10,000 more than the value of any lien against the debtor's
encumbered property, can file an involuntary Chapter 11. If the debtor has 11 creditors,
at least I creditor, meeting the same requirements as previously stated, can file the
involuntary petition. Upon the debtor's objections, the court must determine whether to
enter an order for relief, thereby commencing the bankruptcy case, or sustain the debtor's
objections (if any) to the petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h). The debtor may plead, among
other things, that an insufficient number of creditors joined the petition or that the standard
for filing an involuntary petition has not been established. See Block-Lieb, supra note 28,
at 820-21; see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 65, 303.23 for a more
complete list of requirements, defenses and objections to an involuntary petition.
For an involuntary petition to be sustained, the debtor must be generally not paying
its bona fide debts as they become due, or a receiver or custodian must have been
appointed or took possession of less than substantially all of the debtor's property. See 11
U.S.C. § 303(h). However, creditors must be careful when they file an involuntary
petition. Courts have authority to impose punitive damages for bad faith filings. See 11
U.S.C. § 303(i). Bad faith has been found where the petition was motivated by malice or
ill will and where it was used as a collection device. See Camelot, Inc. v. Hayden, 30
B.R. 408 (E.D. Tenn. 1988); In re Godroy Wholesale, Inc., 37 B.R. 496 (Bankr. D. Mass
1984). The courts may also require the petitioning creditor(s) to file a bond to indemnify
the debtor "for such amounts as the court may later" award in the event of the dismissal
of the involuntary petition. See Block-Lieb, supra note 28, at 828; 11 U.S.C. § 303(e).
Theoretically, if three or more of Heavy Duty's more than 50 trade creditors or any
other creditors get together and have more than $10,000 in undisputed debt, Heavy Duty's
creditors can file an involuntary petition. Practically, creditors rarely file involuntary
proceedings, although it remains a useful threat.
73. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(d) & 301. The current fee for a Chapter 11 case is $800.
74. Melnik, supra note 70 (citing Marks v. Grassmuch (In re Park Towers Corp.), 387
F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1967)).
75. Id.
76. Heavy Duty does not qualify for the small business election under Chapter 11
because it has more than $2million in debt.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
five years, Heavy Duty is arguably a viable business that can once again
be a successful business with some debt readjustment. Heavy Duty's
future depends on its ability to obtain raw materials. Heavy Duty can use
Chapter 11 to (a) negotiate with its landlord, the City of Hope; (b) deal
with its potential environmental liability; (c) find breathing space from
litigious creditors; and (d) continue to operate its business. Further, even
though Heavy Duty's manufacturing plant is old, it still functions and will
be adequate in the short term.
Ill. ANSWER TO QUESTION 2 OF THE HYPOTHETICAL
Having determined that Heavy Duty should proceed to reorganize
under Chapter 11, we turn to an analysis of the many crucial players who
oversee and participate in a business reorganization. Depending on the
case, the players can range from the debtor and creditors and their
respective counsel to investment bankers, appraisers and accountants.
Usually, the debtor and its attorney(s) are the lead players in the
reorganization process. In theory and less often in practice, particularly in
small Chapter 11 cases, one or more creditors' committees provide
oversight.77
A. Debtor-in-Possession
To the shock and consternation of some observers, upon the filing of
a Chapter 11 petition, management of the debtor ordinarily continues to
operate the business. In this capacity, the debtor is known, some would
say very appropriately, as the "debtor-in-possession" or "DIP". Although
the Code and the courts place some restrictions on the DIP's activities, 8
by and large, the debtor continues its normal business activities." The
rationale for leaving the DIP in place is that this will provide continuity
and increase the going concern value of a business."0 Despite the views of
77. See generally Curtin et al., The Debtor's Out-of-Control: A Look at Chapter H1's
Check and Balance System, 1988 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. 87; Martha G. Andrews, The
Chapter 11 Creditors' Committee Statutory Watchdog?, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 247 (1985).
78. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 to 364.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 1108; see also In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990).
80. See, e.g., ELIZABETH E. WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTOR
AND CREDITORS 190 (2d ed. 1991) ("The principal benefit [of revised Chapter 11] might
be that companies will enter Chapter 1I earlier and therefore will be healthier and more
likely to survive when they do. . . [Tihere may be an important benefit in jobs saved and
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some that Chapter 11 entrenches management, studies have shown that
management is commonly replaced pre-filing, during the course of the
case, or as part of the plan process.8' Moreover, a DIP can be removed for
incompetence and dishonesty,82 and there is a recent movement to appoint
examiners and business managers.83
The DIP ordinarily controls both the business and reorganization. The
DIP acts as the representative of the estate and, with limited restrictions,
is required to "perform all of the functions and duties .... of a trustee. '
As such, the DIP also is a fiduciary and has the duty to protect and
conserve the estate's property for the benefit of the creditors. 85 Thus, upon
filing its petition, Heavy Duty's management will most likely remain in
control of the business and also control Heavy Duty's reorganization
efforts.
B. Neutral Third Parties: Trustee and Examiners
Trustees play a quite limited role in Chapter 11 cases. Since there is
a "strong presumption" in favor of permitting a DIP to continue operation
of the business,8 6 the appointment of a trustee is typically described as an
investments protected").
81. See generally LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 56; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor
in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983) (First Installment); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full
Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 247 (1983) (Second Installment).
82. See generally Harvey A. Strickon, Commencement of a Chapter 11 Case, 682
P.L.I./CoM. 51; 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
83. See generally Barry L. Zaretsky, Trustees and Examiners in Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L.
REV. 907 (1993); see also PUTNAM, supra note 22, at 273-86.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6360 states that the debtor-in-possession steps "in
the shoes of a trustee in every way." However, the debtor-in-possession is not entitled to
compensation for its services as it is the debtor.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "the willingness of courts to leave
debtors in possession 'is premised upon an assurance that the officers and managing
employees can be depended upon to carry out the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee'."
See Harvey R. Miller et al., The Chapter )) Players in Contemporary Bankruptcy Practice:
Roles, Obligations, and Ethical Considerations of Debtors in Possession, Trustees,
Examiners and Committees, 656 P.L.I./CoM. 673 (citing Commodity Futures Trading
0am v'n 4. We ,nsaub, 477 U.S. 343, 355 (985 .
85. See generally John T. Rouche, The Fiduciary Obligations of a Debtor in Possession,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 133 (1993).
86. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re North
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"extraordinary remedy" to be granted only after a showing of clear and
convincing evidence that the remedy is warranted. 7 Practically, it is
difficult to convince a court that a trustee is justified unless the DIP is
dishonest or incompetent. "Congress contemplated that when a trustee is
appointed, he [or she] assumes control of the business, and the debtor's
directors are 'completely ousted.' ' 88  Thus, as should be obvious, the
appointment of a trustee can have severe ramifications to a debtor's
business.
Trustees are independent third parties who replace the DIP in a
Chapter 11 and run both the business and the case.89 Since the trustee is
disinterested, he or she may be able to investigate more fully insider
transactions, commence avoidance or preference actions, and, when
necessary, investigate the debtor's wrongdoing.9 ° As detailed in § 1104 of
the Code, a request for the appointment of a trustee may be brought by any
party-in-interest at any time prior to confirmation of a plan.9' The party
requesting the appointment must demonstrate cause or show that the
removal of the DIP or the appointment of the trustee is in the best interests
of parties holding an interest against the estate.92 Additionally, the
appointment of a trustee terminates the debtor's exclusive period to file a
plan of reorganization.93
The duties of a Chapter 11 trustee are set out in § 1106(a) of the
Code. These duties include, but are not limited to, operating the debtor's
Am. Communications, Inc., 138 B.R. 175, 178-80 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992); see also
LoPucki, supra note 81, at 100 (which studies Chapter 11 filings and concludes that almost
all debtors were "able to continue to operate the business as long as they chose to do so
and were able to pay current expenses. Creditor's were powerless to force an end to the
debtor's operations").
87. See Zaretsky, supra note 83, at 916 (citing In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R.
164).
88. Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the
Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director and Sometime Star of Reorganization Passion
Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 450-51 (1995) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1985)).
89. See Zaretsky, supra note 83, at 910; see generally Gail L. Russel, Recent
Developments in Bankruptcy Law: Administration of the Estate, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 81
(1985).
90. Miller, supra note 88.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) & (2).
93. The value of terminating exclusivity has been challenged. If exclusivity were not
terminated, debtors might be less opposed to appointment of a trustee. See Curtin et al.,
supra note 77, at 96.
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business; filing reports and schedules; investigating the debtor's affairs; and
filing a plan of reorganization as soon as practicable.94 The trustee owes,
like a DIP, a fiduciary duty to all parties with an interest in the estate and
can be held liable for acts of negligence occurring in the discharge of his
or her duty.95
A Chapter 11 trustee's fees are governed by §§ 326 and 330 of the
Code. The general rule is that trustees are entitled to reasonable
compensation for services, based on the nature, time spent, and market rate
for those services.96 The trustee's fees are an expense of the administration
of the estate and given first priority upon the commencement of a plan or
distribution (discussed below).97 Additionally, the trustee is entitled to, and
virtually always employs legal counsel and other professionals, and their
fees also enjoy administrative status.98 Some trustees, who are attorneys,
act as their own lawyer. Some retain their own law firm. Still others
retain outside counsel.99
There are costs, although perhaps somewhat overstated in the extant
literature, involved with the appointment of a trustee. Beyond fees, there
is delay as the trustee familiarizes him or herself with the debtor's business
and selects professionals, who likewise must be educated.'00 Furthermore,
the debtor's customers, suppliers, and employees must also become
familiar with the new leadership.''
Another type of independent third party used in Chapter 11 cases is
an examiner. 10 2 The court may appoint an examiner to investigate an
aspect of a case or the debtor's business operations and file a report of his
or her findings. 0 3 Unlike a trustee, the examiner does not displace the
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(5); see also Zaretsky, supra note 83, at 926.
95. See, e.g., In re Western World Funding, Inc., 52 B.R. 143,162-63 tBankr. D. Nev.
1985).
96. It should be noted, that the trustee's rates may be lower than that of an attorney.
Janet A. Flaccus, Bankruptcy Trustee's Compensation: A n Issue of Court Control, 9
13ANKR. DEV. J. 39, 65 (1992).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1). See infra part IV.
98. 11 U.S.C. §§ 328 & 507(a)(1).
99. Compensation becomes tricky since a trustee is only entitled to be paid at the
trustee's rate, not that of a lawyer. So, fee applications require a careful assessment of
what work can, is, and should be, done by the trustee as distinguished from a lawyer. See
generally Flaccus, supra note 96.
100. Miller, supra note 88, at 459.
101. Id.
102. See Zaretsky, supra note 83, at 910.
103. Id.
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DIP;104 nor does such an appointment terminate the debtor's exclusive right
to file a plan of reorganization. A court may order the appointment of an
examiner if it is in the best interests of creditors, any equity security
holder, and other interests of the estate.'0 5  A party requesting the
appointment of an examiner must demonstrate that the benefit to the estate
outweighs the cost.'0 6 However, an examiner must be appointed, on
request of a party-in-interest, if the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured
debts, other than debts for goods, services, or taxes, or debts owing to an
insider, exceeds $5million.'17 The examiner will be compensated for time
spent, and if the examiner employs professionals, they will also be
compensated.'0 8 This compensation will enjoy administrative expense
priority status under § 507(a)(1). However, like trustees, examiners are
rarely used in Chapter 11 proceedings.
In recent years, courts have approved the appointment of examiners
with duties remarkably similar to those of a trustee.' 9 In essence, these
examiners act like trustees but do not divest the DIP of all power. Indeed,
in some cases where the court (or creditors) are concerned about the
debtor's ability to run its business, a business manager is appointed."0
Such an appointment leaves the debtor in place and can be made without
satisfying the stringent standards for appointing an examiner or a trustee.
The growth of this trend merits further evaluation and suggests that the
standards for appointment and consequences of trustee appointment may
be too stringent.
For trustees, examiners and business managers, there is a question of
who gets appointed and how the parties (most particularly creditors) can
advise the United States Trustee (discussed below) as to their choices for
appointment. Unless a trustee is elected by the creditors, the appointee is
selected by the United States Trustee subject to the Bankruptcy Court's
approval."' Since there are no allegations of any wrongdoing on the part
104. Id. at 934.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1).
106. Zaretsky, supra note 83, at 935.
107. 1I U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2)(h); see also In re Revco D.S., Inc. 898 F.2d 498, 500-1
(6th Cir. 1990); Cf. In re Shelter Resources Corp., 35 B.R. 304 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983);
In re GHR Cos., 43 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
108. Zaretsky, supra note 83, at 935.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., In re Steak Loft of Oakdale, Inc., 10 B.R. 182 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
111. Zaretsky, supra note 83, at 916. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) which was added by the
1994 Amendments and provides, in relevant part, that "on the request of a party in interest
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of Heavy Duty, it is unlikely that a trustee will be appointed in this case.
Additionally, it is also unlikely that an examiner or a business manager
would be appointed in this case due to the size of the case and the typical
nature of the issues involved.
C. Committees
A statutory protection afforded creditors, and at times equity holders,
is the formation of committees."1 Under § 1102(a)(1), the United States
Trustee must appoint at least one unsecured creditors' committee in every
Chapter 11 case and may appoint any other committee he or she deems
appropriate to represent an interest adequately." 3 In practice, multiple
committees are uncommon, except in mega cases." 4
A creditors' committee ordinarily consists of persons willing to serve,
drawn from the debtor's largest unsecured creditors." 5 Besides that, there
are no requirements for a person or entity to qualify to sit on a creditors'
committee. The person or entity can hold the unsecured deficiency portion
of a secured claim, be the debtor's landlord, a trade creditor, or the union
representative. These persons are reimbursed for their expenses incurred
in connection with their participation on the committee." 6 The creditors'
committee is a separate entity, distinct from any specific creditor sitting on
the committee," 7 and the committee owes a fiduciary duty to all of its
constituency."' In theory, the committee safeguards the interests of its
constituents by monitoring and negotiating with the debtor in an attempt
made not later than 30 days after the court orders the appointment of a trustee under
subsection (a), the United States trustee shall convene a meeting of creditors for the
purpose of electing one disinterested person to serve as trustee in the case".
112. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
114. See Ronald W. Goss, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: An Overview for the
General Practitioner, 4 UTAH B. J. 8, 10 (1991).
115. 11 U.S.C. § I 102(b)(1). See 11 U.S.C. § I 102(b)(2) for equity security holders'
committee.
116. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) provides administrative status under § 507(a)(1) for such
expenses.
117. See In re Saxon Indus., Inc., 29 B.R. 320, 321 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Proof
of the Pudding, Inc., 3 B.R. 645, 648 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
118. See In re Celotex Corp., 123 B.R. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991). Individual
members incur liability if they breach their duty which has given rise to issues regarding
what committees should do and how members should protect themselves. See generally
Dennis S. Meir and Theodore Brown, Jr., Representing Creditors' Committees Under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 217 (1982).
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to devise a consensual reorganization plan." 9 A committee employs
professionals to assist it in the reorganization process. 2 The appointment
of the committee professionals is subject to court approval, and approved
professionals are entitled to reasonable compensation as administrative
expenses.' 2' To determine reasonableness, courts look at the time, nature,
extent, and value of the services, and the cost of comparable services in a
non-bankruptcy case."'
Creditors' committees have played a vital role in some reorganizations;
however, the majority of committees have fallen short of Congress'
expectations. In smaller cases, committees sometimes are not even formed
due to an absence of creditor interest. In others, the committee is formed
but largely dysfunctional. In larger cases, although their functioning has
not been well studied, there is a sense that the broad powers available to
them are not always utilized.'23 Many have criticized the use of creditors'
committees because of the substantial cost to the estate. 24 Composition of
committees have also been challenged in terms of the diversity (or lack
thereof) of their appointment. 25 Issues have also arisen regarding "split"
committees and the difficalties of altering committee composit ion.
26
D. Judges and the United States Trustee
Prior to the enactment of the Code, bankruptcy judges were actively
involved in the administration and day-to-day affairs of a Chapter 1 1
case. 27 This caused some to believe that judges would not be able to
119. 11 U.S.C. § 1103.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
121. 11 U.S.C. §§ 330, 503(b)(4), 507(a)(1) & 1103 (a).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4); see also Dennis S. Meir & Theodore Brown, Jr.,
Representing Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 217, 227 (1982).
123. See Peter S. Blain & Diane Harrison O'Gawa, Creditors' Committees Under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers, and
Duties, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 581, 582 (1990); Curtin et al., supra note 77, at 88; Lynn M.
LoPucki, supra note 81, at 745 (First Installment).
124. Miller, supra note 88, at 450-51.
125. See generally GROSS, supra note 29, for a discussion of how the committee
members are selected by United States Trustees and providing suggestions for change.
126. See "Why Creditors Don't Want to Serve on Creditors' Committees" 30 BANKR.
CT. DEC. 10 (July 17, 1997); "Representing a Split Committee: What Are Your
Obligations?" 30 BANKR. CT. DEC. 20 (June 10, 1997).
127. Miller, supra note 88, at 433.
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decide litigated matters impartially given their involvement in the debtor's
affairs and business. 28  Therefore, basic administrative duties were
removed from the bankruptcy judge and the office of the United States
Trustee ("UST") was established to handle same.1
29
The UST, an arm of the Justice Department, is a public official who
serves as the watchdog over bankruptcy proceedings to prevent
overreaching, fraud, and dishonesty. The UST's duties include: supervising
the administration of cases and trustees; monitoring fee applications;
evaluating Chapter 11 plans and disclosure statements; ensuring that all
fees, schedules, and reports are properly filed; monitoring creditors'
committees; notifying the United States Attorney of bankruptcy crimes and
participating in their prosecution; and preventing undue delay by
supervising the progress of a case. 30 The UST also has powers under the
Code to participate in litigation and other proceedings, including, but not
limited to, recommending the dismissal of a case and objecting to
discharge. The UST is funded by a complex system with various fees to
be paid by debtors.13 ' The UST system has been criticized since its
inception. There has been concern that the offices of the UST spend their
time on those cases that least require their attention. Moreover, the
bifurcation has not proved as successful as many anticipated, in that
removing judges from the day-to-day administration has made it difficult
for them to manage case progress. In 1994, Congress amended the Code
and injected judges back into administration of cases.
132
There are approximately 320 bankruptcy judges in 90 judicial districts
in the United States. 33  Theoretically, since the administration and
supervision of bankruptcy cases is now in the hands of the UST,
bankruptcy judges primary function is to deal with matters that require
judicial supervision, determination, or approval during the course of a
case'M and to adjudicate disputes. 35 Most importantly, judges are
128. Id.
129. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong. Sess. 89 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6050. See also Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustee, and Family Farmers
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554 100 Stat. 3088 1986 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 581) which made UST a permanent fixture in the bankruptcy system.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 586.
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6).
132. See generally Gross & Redmond, supra note 44, at 295-98.
133. PUTNAM, supra note 22, at 31, citing Ed Flynn, "Bankruptcy Statistical Update
for 1996".
134. See EPSTEIN, supra note 6, § 1-4.
135. Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the Role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
responsible for reviewing any proposed plan, ensuring compliance with
statutory requirements, and entering confirmation orders. 36  However,
bankruptcy judges have once again become involved in the administration
of bankruptcy cases due to the "less than stellar and uniform performance
throughout the United States by the United States Trustee in formulation
and implementation of administrative rules and practices."
137
Furthermore, the recent amendment to § 105 of the Code grants
bankruptcy judges, sua sponte, the authority to hold status conferences
regarding any case or proceeding. 3 8 Bankruptcy judges are also authorized
to enter orders to ensure that a case is being handled expeditiously and
economically. 3 9 These amendments show that Congress acknowledged
that bankruptcy judges active case management and involvement often
benefits all parties, increases efficiency and curbs costs.' 40  Practically,
these amendments reverse the bifurcation of the administrative and
adjudicative functions in the bankruptcy system,' 4' and bankruptcy judges
are once again taking a more active role in case administration.
E. Professionals
Attorneys representing Chapter 11 debtors must be "disinterested"
persons42 and normally will not be disqualified unless there is an objection
by a creditor or the UST. The debtor must file an application with the
court stating facts demonstrating the necessity for the employment, why the
particular attorney was selected, what services will be rendered, and any
of Judicial Time, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1993).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
131. See Miller, supra note $9, t 435. According to 3udge Sixipp, bankr.uply judge
for the District of New Jersey, the UST program is not preforming well:
The problems with the United States trustee system are pervasive and severe,
and part of the ultimate solution may well be to transfer the system to the
Judicial Branch. Regardless of where the United States trustee system is
placed, however, the Congressional intention to remove the bankruptcy judge
from supervision of bankruptcy cases will not be fulfilled until the United
States trustee assumes such responsibility. To the extent that the United States
trustees do so, the bankruptcy judge will be able to devote more of their scarce
time to their primary function of dispute resolution.
Stripp, supra note 135, at 1343-44.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 105(d).
139. See Gvoss & Redmonxd, supra Q3te 44, at 295.
140. Id. at 296; see also Miller, supra note 88, at 439.
141. See Gross & Redmond, supra note 44, at 296.
142. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14) & 327(a).
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connection the attorney has with the debtor, creditors, or any other party-
in-interest.1 43 The attorney must disclose all conflicts of interest and non-
disclosure may justify the denial of all fees earned in the case.
44
Professionals must file an application with the court for payment of fees
and out-of-pocket expenses. The application for fees must be accompanied
by accurate, detailed time records sufficient to enable the court to make an
informed decision as to the reasonableness of the requested fees.
Attorney's fees are administrative expenses under § 507(a)(1) of the Code
and given first priority status.
If the estate requires the services of professionals to provide advice
and assistance in the reorganization process, § 327 of the Code authorizes
the DIP or trustee, with court approval, to engage the services of
disinterested professionals, such as accountants, appraisers, brokers,
liquidators, and investment bankers. 145 If the court approves such retention,
reasonable fees for such services rendered are also an administrative
expense of the estate and receive first priority status. 46  Like all
professionals, approved fees are paid before other unsecured creditors and
deplete the amount of money available to creditors.
Many who criticize the costs of Chapter II cases question the costs
associated with professionals, Although the cost of professionals may be
high, it is unfair to criticize the costs solely because the services are being
rendered in a Chapter 11 case. To combat the costs, some have suggested
alternative approaches, including the parties sharing the costs of
professionals.
4 7
IV. ANSWER TO QUESTION 3
OF THE HYPOTHETICAL
The United States' bankruptcy system establishes a hierarchy in which
a debtor must handle the claims of parties holding an interest in the estate.
The claims of creditors are repaid in an order specified by the Bankruptcy
143. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).
144. Goss, supra note 114, at 10. See generally Nancy B. Rapoport, Seeing the Forest
and Trees: The Proper Role of the Bankruptcy Attorney, 70 IND. L.J. 783 (1995); Nancy
B. Rapoport, Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of Potential
Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy, 26 CONN. L. REV. 913 (1994).
145. 11 U.S.C. §327. See also § 1103(a) (allowing committees to employ
professionals).
146. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(l)(A) & 507(a)(1).
147. See GROSS, supra note 29, at 122-3 (citing Learned Hand, Historical and Practical
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 56 (1901)).
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Code: first, the claims of secured creditors; second, superpriority unsecured
claims; third, priority unsecured claims; fourth, general unsecured claims;
and lastly, equity holder claims and equitably subordinated claims.
Obviously, when there are limited assets available, the higher the priority,
the greater the likelihood of repayment. However, a priority is not a
guaranty of payment; rather, it is a guaranty of an order of payment. In
answering question three, we have focused on priority unsecured claims,
and secured creditors claims will be assessed in our response to question
four.
For a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to be confirmed, it must (1)
designate classes of claims and interests, (2) specify which classes and
claims remain unimpaired, and (3) explain the proposed treatment of any
impaired class.'48 The Code does not require that all unsecured creditors,
other than those with de minimis claims, be placed in the same class and
treated similarly. 4 9 However, the plan must not unfairly discriminate
against any class of claims, and all members of a designated class must be
treated similarly.
Under the Code, certain unsecured claims are treated more favorably
than others. These claims are priority claims under § 507(a) of the Code,
and they are given special treatment under Chapter 11 plans.'50 Since the
Code fixes priority claims by statute, courts may not vary from the
prescribed hierarchy.'' Section 507(a) recognizes nine classes of
unsecured claims that are payable, in descending order, before general
unsecured claims. These claims range from fees of attorneys and
professionals utilized in the administration of the case to claims for child
support, maintenance and alimony.'52 There are also claims, aside from
secured claims, that enjoy higher status than priority claims. These claims
are termed "superpriority" claims. They include claims of postpetition
financiers"'3 and a secured creditor's claim for insufficient adequate
protection. 54
148. 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
149. See PATRICK A. MURPHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRLJvrCY § 17.03 at 17-8
(2d ed. 1993). The grouping of these de minimis claims establishes a "convenience class"
of claims.
150. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9 ).
151. See In re Central R.R. Co. of N.J., 412 F. Supp. 927, 933 (D.N.J. 1976). A
priority claimant could consent to different treatment although that is not common.
152. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1) & (a)(7), respectively.
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1).
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(b).
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After superpriority claims are paid, 155 priority claims under § 507(a)
are paid in full prior to payment of any non-priority unsecured creditor or
equity holder.'56 For example, administrative expenses and involuntary gap
creditors under § 507(a)(1) and (2), respectively, must be paid in full and
in cash on the effective date of the plan.' 57 Priority tax claims under
§ 507(a)(8) must be paid in full in installments over a period of not more
than six years from the date of assessment of the claim.'58 Unless priority
creditors consent to payment over the life of the plan of reorganization, all
other priority claims must be paid in cash on the effective date of the
plan.' Therefore, the classification of an unsecured claim as priority as
opposed to general unsecured status has tremendous impact. Priority
holders expect to be paid in full; 160 in contrast, general unsecured creditors
need only be paid more than the present value of what they would have
received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.' 6' If there is an abundance of priority
claims, most likely there will be insufficient assets available for a 100%
distribution to non-priority unsecured creditors.
First priority status is given to expenses incurred in the administration
of the debtor's estate. Administrative expenses include expenses incurred
after filing a petition that are necessary for the continuation of debtor's
operations. 62 The assumption is that without providing such parties with
top priority, no one would render services or deliver supplies to the debtor
after it files for bankruptcy. Therefore, postpetition wages and salaries of
employees and management and postpetition services by bankruptcy
professionals are afforded administrative expense status. 163 Although the
amount of administrative expenses in Chapter 11 cases has been
155. Normally, these claims are paid in full. If superpriority claims cannot be paid in
full, they will be paid on a pro-rata basis. However, this would mean that no one else will
be paid at all.
156. See W. NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, §12.02 (1987).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(B).
160. See GROSS, supra note 29, at 145-6, 149-55 for a discussion of proliferation of
priorities.
161. See 11 U.S.C. § 129(a)(7), which has come to be known as the "Best Interest
Test." The court must determine what the claim holder would receive in a Chapter 7
liquidation and compare it to value of what the claim holder is receiving under the plan
of reorganization. See generally COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 65, I 129.02[71.
162. See In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 756 F.2d. 517, 519 (7th Cir.
1985) (quoting COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 65, 507.04[1]).
163. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).
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resoundingly criticized,' 64 payment of administrative expenses may not
unnecessarily prejudice the debtor's prepetition unsecured creditors because
they benefit from the administration of the estate and continuation of the
debtor's business.
65
Administrative claims in Heavy Duty's Chapter 11 will consist of
claims of any and all professionals that assist in the administration of the
estate. For example, Heavy Duty's attorney and accountant and any
professional employed by the creditors' committee, such as an attorney or
an accountant, will be paid as first priority. In addition, any postpetition
taxes and claims of employees, pension holders or creditors extending
services after the filing of the petition will enjoy first priority status.
Unpaid postpetition wages of Heavy Duty's employees would also be a
first priority. If a lender advanced monies to Heavy Duty postpetition and
was ultimately unpaid, it would also have a priority (and perhaps even a
superpriority) claim.
The next applicable priority in respect of Heavy Duty's Chapter 11 is
the prepetition unpaid wages of its employees. Section 507(a)(3) provides
third priority status to Heavy Duty's employees for unpaid wages,, salary
and commissions (including vacation, severance, or sick-leave pay) earned
within ninety days preceding the filing of the petition to the maximum
extent of $4000 per employee. If an employee's claim exceeds these
limits, it is treated as a general unsecured claim."6 The purpose of
§ 507(a)(3) is to give employees a chance to receive wages earned
immediately preceding the filing, so as not to deprive them of their
livelihood and insure their continued work for the troubled business. 67
Heavy Duty owes its employees for one week's salary. As long as the
amount owed each employee does not exceed $4000 (the facts already state
that the salary was earned within the ninety days preceding the filing), the
employees will have claims with third priority status. If all or any part of
164. For a discussion of costs in Chapter 11, see Hon. Alexander L. Paskay & Frances
Pilaro Wolstenholme, Chapter 11: A Growing Cash Cow: Some Thoughts on How to Rein
in the System, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331 (1993); Martin J. Whitman & David M.
Barse, Professionals Paid by Debtors Ought to Represent Debtors' Interests, I AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 367 (1993); The Costs of Bankruptcy: Roundtable Discussion 1 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 237 (1993). But see GROSS, supra note 29, at 121-3.
165. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, § 7-11. See also Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 479
(1968).
166. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3).
167. See Northwest Eng'g Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 863 F.2d 1313, 1315
(7th Cir. 1988) ("If employees were treated in all respects as unsecured creditors, they
would be inclined to desert a leaky ship, speeding up the firm's collapse").
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a claim does not satisfy these requirements, the non-qualifying portion will
be treated as a general unsecured claim. Problematically, a priority for
back wages does not mean the employee gets repaid during the Chapter 11
case. By statute, repayment is due upon confirmation. However, as a
practical matter, courts commonly permit early repayments of employees
(under the "doctrine of necessities") to assure continuity and support of the
debtor's labor force.
With certain limitations, pension benefit contributions are provided
fourth priority status. The priority is limited to contributions arising from
services rendered by employees within the 180 days preceding filing and
are, as with wages, capped at $4000 for each employee covered under the
employee benefit plan. 68 Fourth priority status will be afforded to claims
of Heavy Duty's employees for contributions into its pension plan.
However, the Code's limitations are only protective of current or recent
retirees. Therefore, Heavy Duty's retirees' pension contribution (some
portion of the $250,000) will not reap the benefit of the priority under
§ 507(a)(4).
However, Congress, concerned about the plight of retirees whose
companies sought relief under Chapter 11, created § 111 4(e)(2) which
mandates payment for retiree benefits prior to the effective date of a
confirmed plan of reorganization as an administrative expense with first
priority status. 69 "All retiree benefits-whether insured, self-insured, pre-
petition or post-petition-must be paid in full by the company" if a plan
of reorganization is to be confirmed. 170 Therefore, retiree claims against
Heavy Duty's estate will be treated as an administrative expense under
Heavy Duty's plan of reorganization.
Taxing authorities enjoy eighth priority status as § 507(a)(8) of the
Code covers a variety of taxes owed to governmental units.' 71 Stated most
simply, priority is given (among other items) to income taxes for the three
years prior to filing; property taxes payable in the year before the filing;
and interest on such taxes that accrues before the commencement of the
168. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) also provides that the amount paid is reduced by any
amount paid for wages, salaries, or commissions under § 507(a)(3) priority.
169. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(2); See also Daniel Keating, Bankruptcy Code § 1114:
Congress' Empty Response to the Retiree Plight, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 17 (1993).
170. See Susan Block-Lieb, Priority Claims, Including Administrative Expense Claims,
546 P.L.I./CoM. 697, "727 (citing 134 CONG. REC. S6826 (May 26, 1988) (remarks of Sen.
Metzenbaum)).
171. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27), which defines "governmental unit" to include federal,
state, and local governments.
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case. 7 2 Unless the taxing authority agrees otherwise, the priority tax claim
must be paid in full and within six years from the date of assessment of
the tax.'7 3 Heavy Duty owes taxing authorities $1million. If this amount
is within the ambit of § 507(a)(8), the government will enjoy eighth
priority status. However, any portion that does not fit within § 507(a)(8)
will be a general unsecured claim. One word of caution: under the Internal
Revenue Code, unpaid taxes for employee contributions are a personal
liability of corporate officers and directors.
74
All other unsecured claims, as well as any portion of a claim that is
not a priority, are general unsecured claims. Thus, to the extent that Heavy
Duty's suppliers are unsecured, they hold general unsecured claims
aggregating $3million. Under a plan of reorganization, general unsecured
claims must get at least as much as they would get in a Chapter 7
liquidation (termed the "best interest test").'75 In contrast to the treatment
of priority creditors, the Code does not require payment of general
unsecured creditors in cash. Unsecured creditors can receive stock or notes
of the reorganized company, as long as the value thereof exceeds any
available distribution under Chapter 7. Payments of cash can be stretched
out over a period of years (including beyond the six year stretch out period
for taxes), provided that the time value of money is taken into account in
determining satisfaction of the best interest test.
The treatment of Heavy Duty's environmental obligation is the most
problematic and the claim does not fit easily into any of the existing
categories. 76 First, there is a question as to whether there even is a claim
because the obligation has not been determined (i.e., is there liability?).
Second, the pollution is ongoing, suggesting that some portion of the claim
may be a "future" claim which is not actually a claim that is dischargeable
under Chapter 11 of the Code. Third, there is a question as to whether the
claim should be treated as a pre or post-petition obligation (or both), and
this affects whether the claim is unsecured (and paid along with all other
172. See generally Block-Lieb, supra note 170, at 710-20.
173. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C).
174. Note that we would need to assess what, if any, portion of the unpaid tax liability
was for fiduciary taxes. If a company does not repay them, officers and directors will need
to pay them personally. See GROSS, supra note 29, at 126.
175. See supra note 161 for a discussion of the best interest test.
176. Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A Fundamental
Framework, 44 FLA. L. REV. 153, 154 (1992) [hereinafter Heidt, A Fundamental
Framework]. See also Kathryn R, Heidt, Products Liability, Mass Torts and Environmental
Obligations in Bankruptcy: Suggestions for Reform, 3 AM. BANKR. L.J. 117 (1995).
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unsecured claims) or an administrative claim (entitled to priority under §
507(a)(1)).
The inherent conflicts between the environmental law notion that
economic enterprises bear the cost of environmental and public health
protection and the underlying policy in bankruptcy of discharging claims
that exist at the time of confirmation, has lead to the creation of different
treatment for environmental claims. This treatment stems from courts
trying to balance the competing interests.177 For a debt to be discharged
in a bankruptcy, it must be considered a "claim" by the bankruptcy court.
The classification of potential environmental liability as a claim that arose
prepetition in contrast to postpetition has tremendous ramifications. A
prepetition or administrative claim will be addressed in the reorganization
and discharged; a "future" claim will survive bankruptcy and remain an
obligation of the reorganized debtor.'78
Congress intended that the Code define a "claim" broadly to ensure
that "all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or
contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case."' 79 Thus,
Heavy Duty's current liability (if any) for clean up costs of the pollution,
as of the date of filing, even if unliquidated, constitutes a claim as
contemplated by the Code and must be dealt with under Heavy Duty's plan
of reorganization. Such a claim arises when the debtor released or
threatens to release the hazardous substance.' 80  The fact that the
appropriate agency has not gathered information or assessed damages,
merely renders the claim "contingent;" it does not prevent the obligation
from being a claim.' 8 ' Thus, since at least a major portion of Heavy
Duty's environmental liability arose prepetition, it is a recognizable claim
in Heavy Duty's Chapter 11 and can be handled and discharged under the
plan. "'82 Having determined that a claim exists, the next step is to
177. See generally Spracker & Barnette, supra note 51.
178. Heidt, A Fundamental Framework, supra note 176, at 154-55.
179. In re Chateauguay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(5) (which broadly defines a claim as the "right to payment, whether or not such
fight is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured").
180. In re Chateauguay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1002-6.
181. Id. at 1005.
182. However, the claim may not be discharged if the debtor does not give the
appropriate agency specific notice of the environmental problem prior to confirmation. If
there is no notice, the claim may survive the bankruptcy case. Some have argued that the
debtor should carefully weigh the benefits of disclosing the possible liability as disclosure
might adversely affect the debtor's ability to reorganize. See Spacker & Barnette, supra
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determine its status, as the treatment depends on the nature of the claim." 3
For example, if the appropriate agency cleaned the site and secured a lien,
it will enjoy secured status; however, if the agency has taken no action, the
claim will be a general unsecured prepetition claim."s  Generally, an
environmental claim that arises prepetition is deemed a general unsecured
claim. 85 If Heavy Duty continues to pollute postpetition, at least a portion
of the claim may be an administrative expense claim.
Another possible claim in Heavy Duty's Chapter 11 case relates to its
ninety-nine year lease of the land and dock facilities. A lease is treated
under § 365 of the Code. Section 365 of the Code allows the DIP or
trustee to assume, reject, or assume and assign executory contracts 86 and
unexpired leases. Heavy Duty has the right to reject, assume, or assume
and assign the unexpired lease. 87 If Heavy Duty assumes the lease, its
obligations become a postpetition obligation and an administrative expense
of the estate entitled to first priority.8 If Heavy Duty decided to reject the
lease, the breach would be treated as a prepetition breach by the debtor,
and the City of Hope would have a general unsecured claim for damages
under § 502(g) of the Code.
18 9
In deciding whether to assume or reject a lease, the debtor must look
at what is in the best interests of the estate. Thus, if it is advantageous and
will advance Heavy Duty's plans for economic recovery to retain the
ninety-nine year lease, it should assume it. If Heavy Duty decides to
assume the lease, which it should, it must do so within sixty days of the
note 51, at 98-99.
183. See id. at 100-107 (discussing the different categories of claims and their status).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 101.
186. The Code does not define an executory contract but the definition given by
Professor Vern Countryman in his 1973 law review article has become (with some recent
inroads) the accepted definition. Thus, a contract is executory if the obligations of both
parties are so far unperformed that the failure of either party to perform would be a
material breach. But see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Fundamental A nalysis of Executory
Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 229-31 (1989); Michael T. Andrews, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845 (1988).
187. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)( 3 ), which prohibits the assumption of an lease of
nonresidential real property that had been terminated under nonbankruptcy law prior to the
order for relief.
188. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, §§ 5-1 & 5-5.
189. Such a damages claim would be treated as a general unsecured claim and receive
payment, if at all, most likely on a pro-rata basis with the other general unsecured
creditors. Such claims are capped pursuant to § 502(b)(6) of the Code. 11 U.S.C. §
502(b)(6).
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order for relief unless the court extends that period for cause. 90 If Heavy
Duty is in default under the lease, it must cure all defaults within a
reasonable time in order to assume. Assumption or rejection within the
sixty day period must be approved by the court which will scrutinize the
decision under the business judgment rule and will not interfere with the
decision if based on good faith and appears beneficial to the estate.
Provisions of a contract or a lease that permit the nondebtor party to
declare default or termination of the contract or lease because of the
insolvency, financial condition, or bankruptcy of the debtor are ineffective
in bankruptcy.' 9' These ipso facto clauses are given no effect in order to
prevent states or private parties from undermining the bankruptcy process
through laws or contractual terms that are designed to take effect on
bankruptcy. However, the bar on enforcing ipso facto clauses exists only
after the debtor has filed its petition. Therefore, if the nondebtor party had
exercised its right prior to bankruptcy, it may be able to effectively
terminate the contract or the lease prior to bankruptcy, subject to
provisions, if any, of the automatic stay.
192
An additional option available to Heavy Duty if the ninety-nine year
lease is particularly valuable, and Heavy Duty wants to relocate elsewhere,
is the assumption and assignment of the lease. An assignment would
require Heavy Duty to cure all defaults; compensate the City for pecuniary
losses resulting from the default; and provide adequate assurance of future
performance by the new lessee under the lease. 193 Additionally, like ipso
facto clauses, any clause in the lease that prohibits alienation of the
property due to the debtor's insolvency, financial condition, or filing for
bankruptcy is ineffective and void under the Code.' 94
There is one group of claims below general unsecured creditors: equity
holders of the debtor. In a Chapter 11 case, the absolute priority rule
provides that a non-accepting class of unsecured creditors must be paid in
full before any junior class (i.e., equity holders) can receive or retain any
property under a reorganization plan. Thus, until unsecured creditors are
satisfied under the plan, equity holders are not permitted to retain any
interest or receive any money. However, there is a significant exception
190. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4).
191. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, §§ 5-18 to 5-20. See also Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual
Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law, 82 CoRNELL L. REV. 301
(1997).
192. See infra part V.
193. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1).
194. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(1) & 365(f)(3).
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to this rule. The "new value" exception allows equity holders of a
business to obtain an interest in the reorganized debtor in exchange for a
capital infusion that is (1) new, (2) substantial, (3) money or money's
worth, (4) necessary for a successful reorganization, and (5) reasonably
equivalent to the value or interest received. 95 Thus, the plan cannot be
confirmed pursuant to § 1129 of the Code unless all senior classes
(including secured creditors) are fully repaid (or consent to a lesser
payment). This means the owners are unlikely, absent a new infusion of
cash, to recoup their equity contribution, including the new $1million
recently contributed.
One possible class of creditors that fall even below equity holders is
the claims of the debtor's principals (owed $250,000). Under § 510 of the
Code, depending on the circumstances of the loan, the amounts may be
subordinated (termed equitable subordination). This means that, in addition
to losing their equity position, the owners could lose the $250,000 they lent
to the estate unless all senior creditors (including equity holders) are repaid
in full.
The choice of priorities and the treatment of unsecured creditors
reveals serious policy choices. Assuming there are rarely sufficient funds
to repay all creditors, the higher the priority, the greater the chance of
repayment. Thus, we consider administrative claims (which include
bankruptcy professionals) to be "more important" (more worthy) than
employees. Similarly, we consider the government's right to taxes to be
worthy of priority status, but also less worthy than professional fees and
employee wages.
V. ANSWER TO QUESTION 4
OF THE HYPOTHETICAL
A lien that is valid under nonbankruptcy law and unavoidable under
the Code'96 is enforceable in bankruptcy but only to the extent of the value
of the underlying collateral.' 97 Thus, the claim of a creditor whose claim
195. In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 60 S.Ct. 1, 10-11 (1939)). See also Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 203, 206 (1988), which held labor and expertise
were not money or money's worth and insufficient to satisfy the new value exception.
196. For example, a lien that is fully perfected cannot be avoided by the trustee or DIP
under § 544 of the Code.
197. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Section 506(a) of the Code defines an allowed secured
claim as a "claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest .... to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in
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exceeds the value of his or her collateral is an undersecured creditor. As
such, the claim is bifurcated into a secured portion to the extent of the
collateral's value and an unsecured portion as to any deficiency. The
secured portion of the claim will enjoy the status of a secured creditor, and
the unsecured portion will be grouped together and paid alongside other
general unsecured claims. The bank lenders, who are collectively owed $5
million, are Heavy Duty's only known secured creditors.' 98
A secured creditor may negotiate with the debtor to formulate its
treatment under a plan of reorganization. If a consensual arrangement
cannot be reached, the plan may still be confirmed over the objection of
the secured creditor if the plan is fair and equitable.' 99 This is proverbially
known as cramdown.2° The Code provides that (1) the secured creditor
may retain its lien and receive deferred cash payments equal to the value
of the lien; 20 ' (2) the secured creditor's collateral may be sold free and
clear of the lien, with the lien attaching to the proceeds;20 2 or (3) the
secured creditor can receive the indubitable equivalent of its claim.2" 3
Payments stretched over time must also take into account the time value
of money (i.e., paying the secured creditor interest).
When a petition is filed, "one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by bankruptcy law,' 20 4 the automatic stay, comes into existence.
The automatic stay gives the debtor a breathing spell from its creditors; it
stops all collection efforts, foreclosure actions, and debtor harassment by
creditors. 20 ' The automatic stay promotes the reorganization process by
preventing secured and unsecured creditors from dismantling the debtor's
estate and by giving the debtor temporary relief from financial pressures.20 6
such property." The meaning of the term "value" has been addressed in the recent
Supreme Court decision in Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 65 U.S.L.W. 4451, 1997
U.S. LEXIS 3688 (June 16, 1997).
198. Various searches should be conducted by the creditors' committee to confirm the
exact number of secured creditors and to evaluate whether such creditors are perfected.
199. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(1) and (2).
200. Cramdown can be used to refer to the treatment of secured and unsecured
creditors, although it is a term more commonly employed in the context of secured
creditors.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).
202. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
203. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
204. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
205. H.R. Rep. No. 595; BROUDE, supra note 16, § 4.01[1].
206. BROUDE, supra note 16, § 4.01[1].
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Specifically, a secured creditor cannot (a) enforce a security agreement
according to its terms; (b) accelerate the debt (notwithstanding an ipso
facto clause); (c) obtain possession of or exercise control over property in
which the secured creditor has an interest; and (d) sue the debtor.2"7 The
automatic stay also precludes secured creditors from using state law
remedies to realize on their collateral. Thus, the remedies for a secured
creditor provided in Part 5 of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) are not operative in bankruptcy. The secured party's right to take
possession of the collateral upon the debtor's default through self-help and
to dispose of the property in satisfaction of its claim, usually without court
supervision, is barred.208 The secured party's right to foreclose on the
collateral, obtain a judgment and levy upon debtor's property, take
possession of and retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, or garnish
the debtor's wages is also barred.20 9 If the secured party acts in violation
of the automatic stay, such action will be void and can have serious
consequences for the creditor, such as being found in contempt of court
and fined.210
The power of the stay is not permanent. A secured creditor may make
a motion to lift or modify the stay pursuant to §§ 362(d) and 105(a) of the
Code. This would enable the creditor to utilize its nonbankruptcy
remedies. 21  A lift stay motion may be granted "for cause" or by a
showing that the debtor does not have any equity in the collateral and the
collateral is not needed for an effective reorganization. 12 An example of
"cause" is the lack of "adequate protection" of a secured creditor's
collateral due to the ongoing decrease in the value of the collateral without
compensating the secured creditor for such diminution.2"3 Since adequate
207. See generally II U.S.C. § 362(a).
208. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1188 (3d
ed. 1988).
209. See generally UCC §§ 9-501 to 9-507.
210. See BROUDE, supra note 16, at § 4.08; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).
211. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) & 362(d). Section 362(d) is the primary section under
the Code to seek relief from the automatic stay. If the secured creditor does not satisfy
the requirements of § 362(d), the secured creditor can look to §105(a) of the Code.
Section 105 of the Code gives the courts equitable powers and can be invoked to lift the
automatic stay. See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(e), (f), and (g) which provide other grounds
of relief from the automatic stay, including, but not limited to, lifting the stay as is
necessary to prevent irrepwable damage to the ceditoT's interest iii the pr.perty.
212. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d); United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers Assoc., 808 F.2d 363,
370-71 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
213. 11 U.S.C. § 361. As noted in the legislative history:
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protection protects the present value, oversecured creditors (those creditors
whose claim is less than the value of their collateral) are entitled to
interest.214 We do not know in the Hypothetical whether Heavy Duty's
secured creditors are over or under-secured. It would be necessary to value
each secured creditor's collateral. It is clearly possible for one secured
creditor to be secured fully while another is undersecured depending on the
nature of their collateral. Once each secured creditor's position is assessed,
we would need to see whether the value of the collateral in question was
increasing, decreasing or remaining the same, thereby assessing the
likelihood that the stay would be lifted. As a practice pointer, a secured
creditor should move to lift or modify the automatic stay or seek adequate
protection early in a case. This is because the Code accords a priority
claim to a secured creditor for any shortfall that occurs for the period from
the date adequate protection is granted."1 5 Thus, if adequate protection is
not sought and the secured claim diminishes in value, the secured creditor
may not recover the diminution as a priority.
VL ANSWER TO QUESTION 5
OF THE HYPOTHETICAL
Because of the concept of limited liability, and subject to limited
exceptions, officers and directors of corporate entities are not liable for the
debts of the company. 2 6  That means that if a company files for
bankruptcy and discharges its liabilities, officers and directors can
commence a new business the next day. The same is true for shareholders.
Because of limited liability, shareholders can lose their investment but,
beyond that, they have no personal liability for corporate debts. They, too,
can reinvest in a new business, unimpaired, by prior failure. Several of the
The concept of adequate protection is derived from the Fifth Amendment
protection of property interests .... Secured creditors should not be deprived of
the benefit of their bargain. There may be situations in bankruptcy where
giving a secured creditor an absolute right to his [or her] bargain may be
impossible or seriously detrimental to the bankruptcy laws. Thus, this section
recognizes the availability of alternate means of protecting a secured creditor's
interest. Though the creditor might not receive his [or her] bargain in kind, the
purpose of this section is to insure that the secured creditor receives in value
essentially what he [or she] bargained for.
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6295.
214. See BROUDE, supra note 16, at § 4.06[3].
215. See I 1 U.S.C. § 507(b).
216. See generally GROSS, supra note 29, at 27-9 & 125-27.
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key exceptions are worth noting. First, if the shareholders, officers, or
directors commit a fraud or other crime, they can be sued in their
individual capacities." 7 If there are unpaid fiduciary taxes, officers and
directors can also be held responsible.1 8 Certain unpaid environmental
liabilities can lead to personal responsibility. 219 Finally, officers, directors,
or shareholders can guaranty the corporate debt. It is important to note
that if the individual officer, director, or shareholder incurs liability, they
can file personal bankruptcies, and the debt can commonly be discharged
unless it fits within one of the exceptions to discharge under § 523 of the
Code (such as willful and malicious conduct or fraud).220
Generally, the Code does not protect guarantors or corporate officers
and directors from suits for obligations for which they may be held
secondarily liable. However, the bankruptcy court can utilize its equity
powers pursuant to § 105(a) 22 1 to enjoin creditor action against guarantors
who are officers or directors under certain circumstances.222 For example,
if the guarantor can prove that the debtor corporation would be irreparably
harmed if the proceedings against the guarantor continued, the court may
enjoin the action.223 The court w ill consider whether the debtor's directors
and officers need a breathing spell to formulate the debtor's plan of
reorganization free from the encumbrance of defending personal lawsuits.
224
The court will also consider whether there is an identity of interest between
the debtor and the guarantor such that the debtor may be said to be the real
party defendant. If so, a judgment against the guarantor effectively would
be a judgment against the debtor (i.e., when the guarantor is entitled to
absolute indemnity by the debtor).225
217. See generally Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in
Possession: "Don't Look Back-Something May Be Gaining on You, - 68 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 155 (1994).
218. See generally Kimberly Colby Harris, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Liability of
Corporate Directors, 5 BANK. DEV. J. 289 (1987).
219. Id.
220. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
221. The bankruptcy court may "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). See supra
note 50.
222. See Harris, supra note 218, at 290-94.
223. Id.
224. See In re Supermercado Gamboa, Inc., 68 B.R. 230, 233 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1986).
225. See A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cit. 1986); see also, e.g.,
In re Metal Center, 31 BR. 458, 462 (D. Conn. 1983); Seybolt v. Bio-Energy, Inc., 38
B.R. 123, 127-28 (D. Mass. 1984); In re Brentano's, 27 B.R. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
248 [Vol. 17
1997] BANKRUPTCY SOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 249
Further, § 362 of the Code stays any action to obtain possession or to
exercise control over property of the debtor, whether against the debtor or
a third person. 2 6 Property of the estate is broadly defined under the Code
to include "all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of
the commencement of the case," wherever located.221 Therefore, since
insurance policies are considered property of the estate,28 if the guarantor
may be covered under the debtor's insurance policy, the action against the
guarantor may be stayed.
229
Nothing precludes officers, directors, or shareholders from
commencing a new business subsequent to the bankruptcy. They are
entitled to vote in governmental elections; they cannot be imprisoned; and
failure is not seen as a bar to future ventures. Indeed, forgiveness rests at
the heart of American bankruptcy law.230 Whether the extent of limited
liability should remain as part of our bankruptcy system is a worthwhile
question, although its resolution is beyond the scope of this article. 3'
VIIL CONCLUSION
Advising Heavy Duty requires more detail than provided in the fact
pattern. However, even without that detail, it should be evident that access
to the bankruptcy law does not guaranty a successful reorganization.
Instead, it provides an opportunity to reorganize. Many people who
evaluate statistics on confirmation rates in the United States say that a
twenty percent confirmation rate is evidence of failure. Quite to the
contrary.232 While the rate is lower than we would like, one-fifth of
companies that would have failed will be given new life. In lots of fields,
a twenty percent success rate is cause for celebration. Saving Heavy Duty
would benefit a number of individuals and businesses. Even if it
ultimately fails, it will be a more peaceful, organized and humane demise.
Perhaps we would do well to see the glass as one-fifth full in bankruptcy,
not four-fifths empty.
226. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
227. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
228. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 40 B.R. 219, 229 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re
Davis, 730 F.2d 176, 184 (5th Cir. 1984).
229. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 33 B.R. 254, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
230. See generally GROSS, supra note 29, at 93-98.
231. Id.
232. Id.

